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ABSTRACT
Declassification of Faceted Values in JavaScript
by Shreya Gangishetty
This research addresses the issues with protecting sensitive information at the
language level using information flow control mechanisms (IFC). Most of the IFC
mechanisms face the challenge of releasing sensitive information in a restricted or
limited manner. This research uses faceted values, an IFC mechanism that has shown
promising flexibility for downgrading the confidential information in a secure manner,
also called declassification.
In this project, we introduce the concept of first-class labels to simplify the
declassification of faceted values. To validate the utility of our approach we show
how the combination of faceted values and first-class labels can build various
declassification mechanisms.
Keywords- Data confidentiality, Declassification, Downgrading poli-
cies, Dimensions of declassification
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
As technology is growing continuously, many third-party applications are also
increasing. These applications may misuse sensitive information like social security
numbers, passwords, credit cards, or browser history. Providing security to such
information on the internet is a challenging task. There is a risk for data confidentiality
with data leakage. Due to data leakage, 191 million voters of US [1] were affected.
Information flow control enforces the rules and policies to the flow of data within
the program or when the data is sent to a third party application [2]. It can secure
sensitive information by imposing rules within the architecture to prevent data leakage
from trusted sources to untrusted sources.
Several IFC mechanisms were introduced to ensure the confidentiality of data and
to provide non-interference [3][4]. Some of the mechanisms such as permissive-upgrade
[4] and no-sensitive-upgrade [5] guarantees non-interference property. However, these
techniques get stuck when data flows from a high level to a low level. Often relaxation
of non-interference property in secure conditions is needed in the real-world. For
example, sensitive information like credit card number (high level) needs to be disclosed
partially to validate a transaction. Often the last four digits of a credit card are
displayed to validate the payment. In this scenario, non-interference property is clearly
violated. But, this is necessary for a transaction to be successful. The relaxation of
the non-interference property by enforcing security rules and policies is termed as
declassification [6].
Determining whether it is safe to release sensitive information to a lower level
and to structure the rules is a major challenge in the declassification of data [7]. Some
of the dimensions to release information without compromising security are ‘what’,
‘when’, ‘where’, and ‘who’ [8]. Wing [7] has shown that faceted values are flexible to
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downgrade the non-interference property. This project focuses on scenarios where
there is a need for declassification and how it can be achieved using a prominent IFC
mechanism - faceted values (faceted evaluation) [9].
The project is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives a background on information
flow control, types and techniques of information flow control; Chapter 3 describes
the faceted language with the support of faceted values along with its operational
semantics; Chapter 4 describes declassification and various methods of releasing
sensitive information and dimensions; Chapter 5 shows an implementation for faceted
language with support for dynamic label creation, faceted values and declassification,
and examples of dimensions of declassification using faceted values in JavaScript;
Chapter 6 discusses the conclusion and future scope of this project.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1 Information Flow
Information flow is the transfer of information from a variable var1 to another
variable var2 (var1 → var2) in the program. Information about sensitive data
might propagate to a lower level data. In Figure 1, the information of a and b is
flowing through the conditional statement and this code leaks information about a
and b. It is easy to infer the value of a based on this code snippet. If the output is
0 then it is understood that a is greater than or equal to 20. Otherwise, the 20 -
output gives the value of a.
Figure 1: Example of information flow
2.1.1 Explicit Flow
Explicit flow can be described as the direct flow of information from a high-
security level to a low-security level[10]. Figure 2 represents explicit data leakage via
direct assignment of a high-security level (secret) to a low-security level (public).
The value of secret is assigned to public directly and the value of secret can
be easily interpreted.
Figure 2: Example of an explicit flow
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2.1.2 Implicit Flow
In implicit flow, the high level information doesn't flow directly to a low level
information but high level value can be implicitly understood[10]. This flow can leak
partial information or complete information about the secret. In Figure 3, x is a high
level information, the value of x is determined with implicit flow of data. For example,
if the return value of function is false, that is z = false, this implies y = true,
this implies x = false.
Figure 3: Example of an implicit flow
2.2 Overview of Information Flow Control (IFC)
With the exponential growth of data, the risk of protecting it is an unceasing
problem. Sensitive personal data is often stored on computers. An easy and efficient
method is needed to ensure data security. Information flow control (IFC) secures
sensitive information by imposing information flow policies to prevent data flow from
a private or higher security level to a public or a lower security level. IFC is a viable
solution to protect data by preventing data leakage as it can track the outputs of a
program. In IFC, the system monitors the flow of data from one place to another
and regulates the data flow from a higher security level to a lower security level. IFC
guarantees non-interference by preventing implicit and explicit flows [10]. IFC uses
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type-systems [11] and labels to secure data and enforces this via compile-time checking.
The elementary IFC model has a security label - ‘high (h)’or ‘low (l)’associated with
data where the system makes sure no data flows from high to low level. IFC can be
helpful in securing the manipulation of high level and low level data on both client
and server-side [10]. Hence, it can be used to protect data in web applications. IFC
tracks the data flow in the web application that gives possible data leakage locations.
2.3 Information Flow Control Types
Several information flow control techniques were introduced to avoid data leakage.
IFC techniques can be categorized into two types: Static IFC and Dynamic IFC
2.3.1 Static Information Flow Control
In static information flow control, the analysis of the source code is done during
compile time and rejects programs that do not satisfy the rules and policies [10]. Even
though this approach is effective and minimizes the run-time checking, it is restrictive
for dynamically typed languages such as JavaScript [7].
2.3.2 Dynamic Information Flow Control
Static information flow analysis is not well-suited for dynamic scripting languages
and does not guarantee secure information propagation. To overcome these limitations,
dynamic IFC is introduced. In Dynamic information flow control, the policies are
enforced during runtime to prevent implicit data leakage. Dynamic analysis is often
slower than static information flow control in terms of performance but still guarantees
non-interference [10] [7].
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2.4 Information Flow Control Techniques
No-sensitive-upgrade (NSU) [12] [13], permissive-upgrade (PU) [14] [4], secure
multi-execution (SME) [15], and faceted evaluation (FE) [5] are some of the mech-
anisms of dynamic information flow control which deal with implicit flows. All
these mechanisms guarantee non-interference property (termination insensitive non-
interference TINI) which is the private data does not flow through the public data.
Even though NSU and PU guarantees TINI, both of them halt execution. The
execution gets stuck when subtle implicit flows are present in the code to avoid any
sensitive data leakage [9]. This abrupt termination is not due to a web application
violation, or the rules and policies defined, but it is due to the limitation of the
mechanism to track implicit flows. Therefore, in some cases even valid programs are
rejected in dynamic analysis. Therefore, an approach is needed that doesn’t terminate
the program when it encounters the unsafe implicit flows, instead it should show some
counterfeit data. The issue with this approach is that the output might be inconsistent
with the standard language semantics.
Devriese and Piessens [15] implemented a mechanism for IFC called secure multi-
execution (SME) in which the program is divided into multiple copies and each copy
is associated with a security level. In SME, all the copies are executed independently,
hence giving the non-interference property. However, the problem with this approach
is as two copies of the program are executed for each principal, that is it executes
about 2𝑛 copies of the same program for n principals. Wing [7] has explained that
since a program needs to run multiple times in SME, the computation is increased
by a huge margin thereby decreasing the performance. Additionally, as the copies
are executed independently, this provides non-interference property i.e, making it
impossible to get the original data. But in the real-world, there is a necessity to
release some of the sensitive information.
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Austin and Flanagan [9] introduced faceted evaluation (FE) using faceted value
data structure to overcome the issue with SME. Faceted values represent multiple
states for a value at various security levels which guarantees non-interference. A
faceted value is a pair of two raw values which contain the private data and public
data. In faceted evaluation, a single process can mimic the two processes that were
needed in SME. The benefit of this mechanism is when two raw values are similar, the
mechanism combines the two executions into a single execution which reduces overhead.
This mechanism can be used for n principals or values rather than only two. This
mechanism also guarantees termination insensitive non-interference property(TINI)
partly along with avoiding stuck executions. The faster performance of FE over SME
is proven by Wing [7].
2.5 Declassification for Dynamic Information Flow Control
In practical scenarios non-interference is not suitable. Some amount of information
leak is often needed in real systems. For instance, when a person tries to login to
an application, the correctness of the password is known to everyone. This leads
to some leakage of data that is needed but the system could still be called secure.
Often, the non-interference property needs to be relaxed in the real world scenarios.
Downgrading the non-interference property to make the confidential data as a public
data in a secured and controlled manner is called declassification of data. For example,
in the password scenario, a hashing algorithm can be used to encrypt data with a key
that is not known to public. A controlled way of declassifying would be to release
only the details about the hash of the password instead of the password itself.
It is difficult to declassify data using SME [9] [7]. The two processes in SME needs
to be coordinated, which again reintroduces the stuck evaluation and termination
channel. In contrast, it is easy to declassify a faceted value. A single value contains
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both private and public levels that can be restructured easily to move the data from
one level to another level supporting declassification [5].
The rules for determining the restructuring is challenging as declassifying without
any restrictions will eventually lead to no security guarantee. Declassification can be
broadly classified into dimensions. If dynamic flow control methods such as faceted
values can incorporate all the dimensions of declassification, this concept would
become state of the art in the field of data security using IFC [8]. This research
focuses on incorporating these dimensions in real life scenarios and test the feasibility
of implementing all the dimensions. This research also studies the effectiveness of
faceted evaluation in releasing the sensitive information when its inevitable.
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CHAPTER 3
Faceted Language
This project combines faceted value data structure [16] and native programming
language features to construct a Faceted Language (FL). FL supports the native
features of a programming language and faceted values data structure. This language
creates first-class labels which are created dynamically when needed. These labels are
associated with a public and a private values which are wrapped in a faceted value.
In this context, labels serve a role similar to object capabilities [17], in that labels
grant the authority to defacet faceted values.
JavaScript is most widely used in client-side and server-side scripting. It supports
dynamic typing, and first-class functions. This language is implemented in JavaScript
as the previous work has shown promising support of faceted values with JavaScript
[9][16].
3.1 Faceted Values
A faceted value has a security label, a higher level information and a lower level
information [16].
Syntax: < label ? privateValue : publicValue >
The above syntax represents faceted value. ‘label’ is a security label that
represents the access privilege of a user. ‘privateValue’ represents a higher level
data. ‘publicValue’ represents a lower level data.The syntax of faceted values
is similar to that of a ternary operator. While a ternary operator is an expression,
faceted value is a data structure. Based on the security label evaluation, each faceted
value evaluates to either a lower level data or a higher level data.
Faceted values can be nested. A single value or variable has multiple facets based
on the security labels associated with it.
Example:<label1 ? <label2 ? high : low2 > : low1>
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3.1.1 Classification of data
Classification is wrapping of sensitive data and its associated security labels
in a faceted value. Let’s consider a scenario of credit card number where admin
can view all the digits of credit card number and others can view just the last four
digits. Figure 4 represents classify function. For easier understanding, this use-case
is implemented in JavaScript instead of FL. This can also be implemented in FL.
Faceted value returned in this function can be represented as fv = <label ?
creditCardNum: lastFourDigits>
Figure 4: Example implementation of classification of data
3.1.2 Defacet of data
Defacet is unwrapping the faceted value with the help of security labels. Figure 5
represents the defacet function that takes label and a faceted value as the input and
returns either a private value or a public value. If an admin wants to see the credit
card number, upon calling the defacet function with admin label displays the entire
credit card number. For example, defacet("admin", fv) will return the credit
card number and defacet("user", fv) will return the last four digits.
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Figure 5: Example implementation of defacet function in JavaScript
3.2 Grammar and Semantics for Faceted Language
3.2.1 Grammar
Figure 6 represents the grammar for FL. This language contains expressions
(e) and values (v). This language supports boolean values, integer values, strings,
faceted values, and labels. The expressions (e) of this language are similar to most
of the imperative language features such as variables, values, assignment operators,
conditional expressions, binary operators, and function (lambdas) application. These
features are helpful in implementing functional programming aspect of JavaScript.
This language supports additional expressions for built-in support of faceted
values. The createLabel expression is used to create a new label dynamically
for the faceted values. The developers has the control over this label. Developers
can assign these labels to users based on their access privileges. This language also
supports classification and declassification of data for boxing and unboxing the faceted
values with dynamically created labels.
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𝑒 ::= Expressions
𝑥 variables
𝑣 values
𝑥 := 𝑒 assignment
if 𝑒 then 𝑒 else 𝑒 conditional expressions
𝑒 𝑒 function application
binop (𝑒, 𝑒) binary operators
createLabel() creates a label dynamically
classify(𝑒, 𝑒, 𝑒) classify as faceted value
defacet(𝑒, 𝑒) defacets an expression
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑝 ::= + | − | * | / | > | >= | < | <= Binary Operators
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑝 ::= && | || Logical Operators
𝑣 ::= Values
𝑏 Boolean
𝑓 Faceted value
𝑖 Integer
𝑠 String
𝑙 Label
𝜆𝑥.𝑒 Function
Figure 6: The Faceted Language
3.2.2 Operational Semantics
The runtime behavior of any programming language is described by operational
semantics. Operational semantics are of two types: big-step and small-step semantics
[18]. This project formulates evaluation rules of FL using big-step operational seman-
tics. Figure 7 shows all the evaluation rules followed to delevop this language.
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Evaluation Rules: 𝑒, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎′
[bs-val]
𝑣, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎
[bs-var]
𝑥, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝜎(𝑥), 𝜎
[bs-assign]
𝑒, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎′
𝑥 := 𝑒, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎′[𝑥 := 𝑣]
[bs-op]
𝑒1, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣1, 𝜎1 𝑒2, 𝜎1 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣2, 𝜎2
𝑣 = 𝑣1 𝑜𝑝 𝑣2
𝑒1 𝑜𝑝 𝑒2, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎2
[bs-iftrue]
𝑒, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝜎1 𝑒1, 𝜎1 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣1, 𝜎2
if 𝑒 then 𝑒1 else 𝑒2, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣1, 𝜎2
[bs-iffalse]
𝑒, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, 𝜎1 𝑒2, 𝜎1 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣2, 𝜎2
if 𝑒 then 𝑒1 else 𝑒2, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣2, 𝜎2
[bs-application]
𝑒1, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 (𝜆𝑥.𝑒′), 𝜎1 𝑒2, 𝜎1 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎2
𝑒′[𝑥 ↦−→ 𝑣], 𝜎2 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣′, 𝜎′
𝑒1 𝑒2, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣′, 𝜎′
[bs-label]
𝑣 := 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙()
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎
[bs-classify]
𝑒1, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑘, 𝜎1 𝑒2, 𝜎1 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣1, 𝜎2
𝑒3, 𝜎2 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣2, 𝜎3 𝑓𝑣 :=< 𝑘 ? 𝑣1 : 𝑣2 >
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑓𝑣, 𝜎3
[bs-defacet]
𝑒1, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑙, 𝜎1 𝑒2, 𝜎1 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣, 𝜎2
𝑣1 := 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡(𝑙, 𝑣)
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝑒1 𝑒2, 𝜎 ⇓𝑝𝑐 𝑣1, 𝜎2
Figure 7: Big-Step Semantics for Faceted Language
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𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑥 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝜎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎
𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙
𝑏 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑣 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝜆𝑥 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
Figure 8: Notations
The language uses program counter pc to effectively manage labels of faceted
values.
BS-VAL
This big-step semantics represents that a value always evaluates to a value.
BS-VAR
BS-VAR big step semantics represents the variables of faceted language. The
program checks if the variable exists in the store and returns its value. According to
the evaluation rule, the value of the variable x is returned after the lookup of x in
(𝜎) data store.
BS-ASSIGN
The expression x := e indicates that the value of e is assigned to a variable x.
Firstly, the expression (e) is evaluated to a value type that the language supports
and if the variable x is not present in the store it adds the variable along with its
value to the store.
BS-OP
This represents the binary operation of the language. This takes two expressions
as inputs and evaluates to its corresponding values. These two values are evaluated
with its operator and the result is returned.
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BS-IFTRUE and BS-IFFALSE
These semantics represents the if else conditional statements. If the expression
e1 evaluates to true then the expression e2 is evaluated or else the expression e3 is
evaluated.
BS-APPLICATION
This evaluation rule is for function application. The expression 𝑒1 evaluates
to a function and the expression 𝑒2 evaluates to a value that is consistent with the
language. This value is the parameter for the function that can return any primitive
value or a function.
BS-LABEL
A new label is created each time createLabel function is called. To implement
the functionality of label, built-in JavaScript objects called Symbols are used. A
new value gets generated every time new Symbol() is invoked. This implies that
any two Symbols are always unequal.
BS-CLASSIFY
Classify takes a label, a private value, and its corresponding public value as the
input and wraps these values in a faceted value. The expression e1 always evaluates
to a label and e2, e3 evaluate to supported values of the FL.
BS-DEFACET
Declassify unboxes the faceted value and give a private value or a public value
based on the access label. Declassify takes two expressions as inputs. The expression
e1 evaluates to a label and expression e2 can evaluate to a faceted value or any other
primitive values supported by the language. If e2 evaluates to a value other than
faceted value then the defacet returns the value without declassifying. If e2 evaluates
to a faceted value then the function declassifies the faceted value and returns a private
or a public value based on the user scope and associated security labels.
15
CHAPTER 4
Declassification
The security properties confidentiality and integrity that are specified by infor-
mation flow policies can be formalized as non-interference. According to this property
the confidential data does not affect the public data [6][19]. Pure non-interference
properties allow programs to flow from a low security level to a high security level but
not vice-versa. In practice, following non-interference property is often not suitable
for real-world scenarios. Often data needs to flow from a high security level to a lower
security level by preserving the data confidentiality. For instance, average salary given
by a company needs to be displayed from the salaries database which is sensitive for
statistical purposes. In this scenario, the sensitive information (salary) is flowing from
high security level to low security level [8]. Hence, downgrading of security policies in
a controlled manner is often necessary. Downgrading is specification of information
flow from a high level to a low level which is also known as declassification.
4.1 Declassification mechanisms
Declassification can be broadly classified into four axes or dimensions [8]. They
are: what information is released, where in the system information is released, who
releases the information, and when the information can be released.
4.1.1 Dimensions of Declassification
Every dimension satisfies the following criteria [8][20]:
• Information can flow from low to high level directly
• Information cannot flow from high to low level directly
• Information can flow from high to declassifier and declassifier to low level where
declassifier restricts the information flow based on rules and policies
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The following are the four dimensions of declassification [8]:
1. What information is released
This classifier is based on what kind of information is released. This dimension
guarantees that there is only partial release of information. Selective or partial release
can be specified on exactly what parts of the sensitive information could be released.
For instance, based on context the of leaking SSN or password, the ‘what’classifier is
password field or the SSN field and the constraints are hash of the password or the
last four digits of SSN.
2. When the information can be released
This classifier is based on the temporal dimension of the information to be
released. For example, bidding information of an auction can be released only when it
is completed. In this classification, the secret information is leaked only if it can be
executed in a non-polynomial time. There are three specifications for the when based
dimension. They are:
• Time-complexity based: This policy states that information can be released
only after a specified time.
• Probabilistic: This policy states that the if possibility of hacker being able to
distinguish among the true values of secret in less than some constant value
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑛 then the system is secure [8]. 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑛 is a threshold value which can be
chosen when a policy is defined.
• Relative: This policy explains about relating the time when declassification
may occur and other actions that are being done in the system. As an ex-
ample, only after the payment is confirmed, the payment information can be
released(declassified).
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3. Where the information is released
This classifier is based on the location where the information is released in
the system. For example, the information can be released only in the conditional
statements where the data is evaluated. In this dimension, if a part of the system
is authorized to release the information it is assured that no other part can leak the
information apart from the authorized part. There are two types of locality that could
be possible based on the where dimension of information release.
• Code locality: Code locality are a set of policies that can explain possibilities
of information leakage in the code.
• Level locality: Levels where information would flow in comparison to the
security levels of the system are explained by these policies.
4. Who releases the information
This classifier is based on the access levels of the user. If a user has access
to the information, he/she can release the data and is considered a valid use case.
Information release of data is said to be safe if it is performed by owner who is exactly
recorded in the data security label. It is important to specify ‘who’ controls the release
of information. One can use security labels for explicit owner information. Myers
and Liskov [21] proposed a combination model of information flow control and access
control. This model is used in implementation of Java Jif compiler [22].
Zdancewic and Myers have proposed a technique called robust declassification
[23] which ensures that attackers cannot misuse the information. This model assures
that if a passive attacker is not able to identify where the secret data is altered in two
memories then active attacker also cannot distinguish between those two memories.
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CHAPTER 5
Implementation
This project mainly considers three views of writers. The language writer is
responsible for writing the language and semantics for Faceted Language. The language
writer has a better understanding of security principles than the other writers. The
library writer is responsible for writing the libraries for wrapping and unwrapping
the sensitive information using faceted values. The library writer is responsible
for assigning the dynamically created security labels to sensitive information. The
application writer or developer uses the functions given by library writer to classify
or declassify sensitive information. The labels creation and usage are not known to
application writer.
This section shows the implementation code for supporting faceted values in
JavaScript (Node.js) and various scenarios where declassification is possible with
faceted values. Library writers can use these declassification functions and faceted
values to build their own rules and policies based on the context and situations.
5.1 Faceted Language
The below are the code snippets for supporting faceted values in JavaScript. This
code follows runtime evaluation rules that are implemented in Chapter 3.
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5.1.1 Dynamic label creation
Figure 9 represents the code snippet for createLabel functionality in
JavaScript. createLabel creates a new Symbol each time it is invoked. The
developer who has explicit access to the label can view the label and also assign these
labels to users. The security label gets created during runtime and cannot be modified
by any other function thus meeting the criteria to be called as first-class labels. Each
high level data can have a single label or an array of labels associated with it.
Figure 9: Dynamic security label creation
5.1.2 Classification of private data into a faceted value
Figure 10 represents classification of data into faceted values using first-class labels.
The function createFacetedValue takes secret and public as the input and wraps
or classifies those values using a dynamically created label. createFacetedValue
returns a faceted value with a newly created label and its associated secret and public
data.
Figure 10: Classification of data using first-class labels
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5.1.3 Defaceting of faceted value based on the labels
Figure 11 represents the function that returns a value to the users based on their
access privileges on that faceted value. The caller gives a label or array of labels as
the input to the defacet function along with the faceted value for which he/she wants
to get the private information. Based on the given label or labels defacet function
returns a private value (leftValue) or a public value (rightValue).
Figure 11: Defacet function
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5.2 Implementation of declassification scenarios in faceted values
This section shows flexibility of faceted values by implementing some of the
real-world scenarios for declassification.
5.2.1 Non-interference
Figure 12 shows how non-interference can be achieved in FV. The function
tiniMkSecret takes private and public data as the input and returns a faceted
value. In this function, there is no way in which declassification is possible for the
faceted value created by makeFacetedValueNI as the scope of the label is within
the function. Hence, in this example, we can create faceted values but we cannot get
the private value back, thus guaranteeing non-interference.
Figure 12: non-interference (No declassification)
5.2.2 Declassification with no restrictions
Figure 13 represents a function that returns the private data to anyone who
has access to declassifyWithNoRestrictions function. Library writers can
create a function that returns makefacetedValueForWithNoRestrictions
and its corresponding declassification function declassifyWithNoRestrictions
without any rules or policies. As seen from the code, FV are flexible to declassify
without imposing any constraints.
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Figure 13: Declassification with no restrictions
5.2.3 Temporal dimension based declassification
Figure 14 represents an example of time based declassification. Auction scenario
can be taken as an example for when based declassification. A policy that is relevant
to this scenario is “release the bid information only after the auction is completed”.
timebasedMkSecret takes private and public facets as input along with auction
closing time. The developer can design a function as Figure14 and give access to the
label to all the bidders. If anyone tries to access the bid data before the auction ends,
they won’t be able to see the actual bid information. However, once the auction ends,
everyone can view the bid information. Faceted values are functioning as required in
this scenario as well. There are no changes to the language semantics to perform this
type of declassification operation.
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Figure 14: Time based declassification
5.2.4 Declassification to release hash of the password
A canonical example of what based declassification is release of password. The
password is still protected even if the hash is leaked. As hashing is a one-way
encryption, there is no way to get the password using the hash. A policy that
states “only hash of the password may be released when a user tries to login” can
be implemented using faceted values. Developers can use this function to create
faceted values for password with the help of makeFacetedValueForPassword
and also release the hash of the password with the help of hashPassword. If a
hacker/third-party system requests to view password or validate password, the hash
of the password is returned. Here, the password itself is not leaked. Hence, the system
is still secure.
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Figure 15: Declassification for releasing Hash of the password
5.2.5 Release last four digits for Credit Card
This scenario is another example of what based declassification. Here, we need
to release the information about credit card but the policy is “release only the last
four digits to the authorized users”. This can be easily implemented using FV. Figure
16 represents the code snippet for this policy. makeCreditCardFacetedValue
gives the faceted value that represents the credit card number. The function
getLastFourDigits gives the last four digits of the credit card number if the user
has access to the security label, else an empty string is displayed.
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Figure 16: Declassification for releasing last four digits of the credit card
5.2.6 Who based Declassification example
Figure 17 represents an example scenario of who based declassification. The
library writer explicitly specifies or stores the list of valid users who can classify and
declassify sensitive information. The function makeFacetedValues can be used for
creating faceted values and the function releaseData can be used for declassifying
the sensitive information.
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Figure 17: Who based declassification
5.2.7 Limitations of Declassification with faceted values
Library writer bears an additional responsibility of carefully writing the rules of
declassification. If the functions written by library writer are compromised then the
system becomes vulnerable to attacks.
In the who based declassification mechanism implemented in this project, the
library writer explicitly specifies which user can classify or declassify the data. But,
ideally this is not a suitable approach and is prone to attacks. Zdancewic and Myers
[23] implemented Robust declassification system. Our implementation doesn’t support
this system as it needs an overhead of adding a new data structure pair which has a
pair of labels. Each pair has two labels. One label represents which user can modify
the sensitive information (Integrity) and the other label represents the authorization
of user to view the sensitive information (Confidentiality).
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In this project, level locality of where based declassification is internally imple-
mented by nested faceted values. This project has not explored the code locality
where based declassification. This could be a future direction for this project.
JavaScript introspection exposes all the functions and properties associated with
FV object. We need a mechanism that doesn’t allow the introspection related function
calls. Our approach assumes that all the JavaScript Reflection function calls are not
allowed.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
The necessity for an optimal data security mechanism is increasing with the
amount of data and huge number of web applications. This project explored declassi-
fication for information flow analysis specifically focusing on faceted values.
The combination of first-class labels and faceted values have shown promising
results for implementing different declassification scenarios. We validated our approach
by implementing different scenarios that covers the ‘what’ [8], ‘when’ [8], ‘who’ [8]
[23], non-interference, and unrestricted declassification for faceted values. With the
help of the implemented examples, we can infer that faceted values and first-class
labels are flexible for implementing most of the dimensions of declassification without
changing the semantics of the language.
Future work for this project is to combine multiple dimensions of declassification
to define a policy for practical scenarios. Another interesting direction could be
to implement Robust declassification [23] to make the who based declassification
secure. Another idea is to implement ‘where’ based declassification. Another idea is
to incorporate all the policies and rules for an entire web application. This would
give conclusive proof of the flexibility of faceted values for declassification as a whole.
This research can also be extended by formulating concrete mathematical proofs to
guarantee the security properties of the language design.
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